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Abstract
We apply a simultaneous equations framework, similar to that of Prusa and Sharp (2001), to
the recent shrimp antidumping investigation in order to determine how much injury to the
domestic industry—proxied by deterioration in domestic shrimp prices—is attributable to
subject imports versus other market factors. We construct an econometric model then
estimated with three−stage least squares (3SLS). We then apply the movements of each
explanatory variable over the period of investigation (POI) to its respective coefficient in
order to determine how much injury is attributable to that particular market factor. We find
that subject and non−subject imports were essentially equal causes of injury to the domestic
industry.
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Under U.S. trade law, the administration of antidumping investigations is divided 
between the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the International Trade Commission (ITC).  
The DOC determines whether imports subject to the investigation have been sold in the United 
States at “less than fair value” (i.e., being dumped). For reasons well known and thoroughly 
discussed in the literature, the DOC almost always rules affirmative on the dumping issue 
(Blonigen and Prusa 2004, Boltuck and Litan 1991, Lindsey 1999, Prusa and Sharp 2001, Sabry 
2000).  For cases in which the DOC votes affirmative, the ITC determines whether the 
petitioning U.S. industry has been “materially injured” by subject imports.  Since the ITC rules 
affirmative on approximately 50 percent of the cases, the material injury phase is considered the 
principal barrier to domestic industries successfully obtaining antidumping duties on their 
foreign rivals (Blonigen and Prusa 2004, Durling and McCullough 2005).    
In the material injury phase, the ITC is required by international law to distinguish 
injurious effects caused by subject imports from those caused by other factors (WTO 
Antidumping Agreement, Article 3.5).  However, disentangling the injurious effects of subject 
imports from other factors appears to pose a serious challenge to the ITC.  Although econometric 
methods for determining attribution of injury have been offered by Grossman (1986), Pindyck 
and Rotemberg (1987),
1 and Prusa and Sharp (2001), the ITC has traditionally favored a less 
formal “trends analysis” which makes no serious attempt to disentangle the injurious effects of 
subject imports from other sources (Blonigen and Prusa 2004, Durling and McCullough 2005, 
Kaplan 1991, Morke and Kruth 1989).  Subsequently, in at least three recent cases, the WTO has 
found that the ITC’s traditional (non-econometric) approach to injury attribution does not meet 
obligations under the WTO Safeguards and Antidumping Agreements (Durling and McCullough 
2005).  Citing the gap between the ITC’s legal obligations and actual practice, Durling and 
McCollough (2005) conclude that formal econometric analysis, such as that offered by Prusa and 
Sharp (2001), can be invaluable in fulfilling the ITC’s obligation to disentangle the injurious 
effects of subject imports from those caused by other factors.   
  While there is no shortage of trade disputes between the United States and its trading 
partners, the antidumping petition filed by U.S. shrimpers against their counterparts in Brazil, 
China, Ecuador, India, Thailand and Vietnam
2 has been dubbed “this season’s biggest trade 
fight” by the national media (King 2004).  In this paper we apply a simultaneous equations 
framework, similar to that of Prusa and Sharp (2001), to the shrimp antidumping case in order to 
determine how much material injury—proxied by deterioration in domestic shrimp prices—is 
attributable to subject imports versus other market factors.  In Section 2 we present the empirical 
methodology.  Specifically, in Section 2.1 we present the econometric model.  In Section 2.2 we 
provide the empirical results estimated with three-stage least squares (3SLS).  In Section 2.3 we 
apply the movement of each explanatory variable over the period of investigation (POI) to its 
respective coefficient in order to determine how much injury, in dollar terms, is attributable to 




                                                           
1 Grossman (1986) and Pindyck and Rotemberg (1987) are in the context of escape clause (Section 201) cases. 
2 Investigations Nos. 731-TA-1063-1068, Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp and Prawns from Brazil, 
China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
   22.  An Econometric Model of Supply and Demand: Warmwater Shrimp 
 
In the shrimp antidumping case, the principal allegation is that domestic warmwater 
shrimpers (Petitioners) have over the POI (2000-2002) faced “increasingly depressed prices for 
their products due to significant underselling of imports from the subject countries” (“Petition, 
Volume II,” p.1).  In this section, we develop a simultaneous equations model to determine how 
much material injury, proxied by deterioration in the domestic ex-vessel prices of warmwater 
shrimp, is attributable to subject imports versus market factors other than subject imports.  In 
Section 2.1 we present the model, in Section 2.2 we discuss the model’s results, and in Section 
2.3 we quantify the domestic price deterioration due to each explanatory variable over the POI.  
 
2.1 The  Model 
We construct a simultaneous equations model of supply and demand for domestic 
warmwater shrimp.  The model can be expressed generally as,   
Demand:   ) , , , , , , , ( Nov Jan Yearno Fish Fxedp P P Q f P D D NR R D D − = l l l l l l   
Supply:     ) , , , , , _ , _ , ( 1 ,
2
1 , 1 , Nov Jan Cpue Sbr Dsl ice Tack ice Tack Q f P D t D D t D t D D D − = − − − l l l l l
where,  D P l    =  Price (ex-vessel) of domestic brown, white and pink shrimp ($/lbs),
3 expressed 
as natural logarithms 
 
D Q l   =  Quantity (ex-vessel) of domestic brown, white and pink shrimp (in lbs),
2 
expressed as natural logarithms 
 
R P l   =  Price of relevant shrimp imports from Respondent (subject) countries ($/lbs),
4 
expressed as natural logarithms 
 
NR P l   =  Price of relevant shrimp imports from Non-respondent (non-subject) countries 
($/lbs),
10 expressed as natural logarithms 
 
D Fxedp l   =  U.S. total annual food expenditure at eating and drinking places
5 ($ million), 
expressed as natural logarithms 
 
D Fish l   =  U.S. Producer Price Index (PPI) for fish and seafood (excluding shellfish),
6 
expressed as natural logarithms  
  Yearno  =  Number of year, (i.e.1990 = 1, 1991=2, etc.) annual linear trend. 
  Nov Jan−   =  Monthly seasonal (0-1) dichotomous (“dummy”) variables, January to 
November. 
 
1 , _ − t D ice Tack   =  U.S. PPI for fishing tackle and ice,
7 lagged one month 
  D Dsl l   =  U.S. PPI for diesel fuel,
8 expressed as natural logarithms 
  1 , − t D Sbr l   =  U.S. PPI for ship building and repairing,
9 expressed as natural logarithms and 
lagged one month 
  D Cpue l   =  Shrimp “catch per unit effort” for the Gulf of Mexico,
10 expressed as natural 
logarithms 
                                                           
3 From NOAA Fisheries, available at http://www.st.nmfs.gov/st1/ commercial/landings/monthly_landings.html.  
4 From ITC Dataweb, available at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/user_set.asp. 
5 From USDA, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/ CPIFoodAndExpenditures/Data/table3.htm.  
6 Series ID# PDU2092#3, from BLS, available at www.bls.gov.  
7 Averaged PPI series due to collinearity.  ID# WPU15120103 and ID# PDU2097#, available at www.bls.gov.  
8 Series ID# WPU057303, from BLS, available at www.bls.gov.  
9 Series ID# PDU3731#, from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at www.bls.gov. 
10 From Dr. James M. Nance, Supervisory Research Fishery Biologist and Chief of Fishery Management Branch; 
National Marine Fisheries Service, Galveston Laboratory.  Data obtained via e-mail request.
   3The price of domestic warmwater shrimp ( ) and its quantity ( ) are 
simultaneously determined by the supply and demand equations.  The relationships between the 
exogenous variables and the price of domestic warmwater shrimp may warrant further 
explanation.  
D P l D Q l
On the demand side, several comments regarding the variables   and   are in 
order.  Since 1984, the ITC has cumulated imports across countries when determining injury 
(Blonigen and Prusa 2004).  With cumulation, the ITC aggregates all subject products from 
Respondent countries to assess their combined impact on the domestic industry.  In the model 
above,   denotes the average U.S. price (in logarithms) of cumulated subject shrimp imports 
from the Respondent countries.  In a like manner, we have also included cumulated average U.S. 
prices for the same shrimp products imported from exporting countries that are not a party to the 
complaint (i.e., the Non-respondent counties, ).  As imports from Respondents and Non-
respondents alike are substitutes for the domestically produced like-product, one would expect 
positive coefficients for both   and .  However, assuming that the Petitioners argument is 
correct, one would expect a relatively stronger price influence from the Respondents (i.e., those 
explicitly accused of engaging in “significant underselling” in the U.S. market). 
R P l NR P l
R P l
NR P l
R P l NR P l
While certainly shrimp may be procured for home consumption, the variable  , 
food expenditure at eating and drinking places, is intended to capture the effects of demand for 
prepared meals on the demand (and hence price) for shrimp.  A positive coefficient, therefore, 
would be expected for that variable.  As a proxy for shrimp substitutes, a positive coefficient 
would be expected on the variable , as well.  If the price of seafood (other than shrimp) 
were to rise, one would expect consumers to substitute away from it in favor of shrimp, thus 
causing the price of shrimp to rise.   
D Fxedp l
D Fish l
On the supply side, if diesel fuel prices ( ) or the costs associated with repairing and 
maintaining vessels ( ) increase, one would expect that shrimp prices would rise 
accordingly.  Thus, positive coefficients are expected on each of these variables.  Notably, 
however, tackle and ice prices were thought to increase prices at a decreasing rate.  If, indeed, 
tackle and ice prices do increase domestic shrimp prices at a decreasing rate, the coefficient on 
 will be positive while the coefficient on   will be negative.   
D Dsl l
1 , − t D Sbr l
1 , _ − t D ice Tack
2
1 , _ − t D ice Tack
  Finally, increases in catch per unit effort ( ) are expected to drive down prices of 
domestic warmwater shrimp.  A higher catch per unit effort connotes a rightward shift in the 
supply curve and falling prices.  Thus, for this final variable on the supply-side, we would expect 
a negative and statistically significant coefficient. 
D Cpue l
 
2.2 The Results 
The shrimp model, described above, was estimated with 3SLS using monthly data from 
January 1990 through December 2002.  The 3SLS estimation results are presented in Figure 1.   
Figure 2 graphically depicts the model’s predicted domestic prices of warmwater shrimp as well 
as actual domestic prices of warmwater shrimp.  From Figure 2, and by the statistical 
conventions provided in Figure 1, it appears that the econometric model fits well.  The fact that 
the supply curve is upward sloping and the demand curve is downward sloping is not imposed on 
the model, but rather is determined by the data.  In Figure 1, all thirty-four coefficients have 
expected signs, and thirty-two of them are statistically significant at α =0.05 or α =0.01.  The 
   4system weighted R
2 also indicates that the supply and demand equations have captured most of 
the variability in the dependent variable ( ). D P l
11
According to the model, decreases in either Respondent prices ( ) or Non-respondent 
prices ( ) would adversely affect domestic prices.  In fact, the estimated effect of Non-
respondent import prices (0.409) is approximately equal to the estimated effect of Respondent 
import prices (0.403).  Further, increases in time (Yearno) or catch per unit effort ( ), as 
well as decreases in food expenditures ( ), the price of substitutes ( ), diesel fuel 
prices ( ), or the costs associated with repairing and maintaining vessels ( ) would 
deteriorate domestic shrimp prices.  In addition, domestic shrimp prices will rise with the tackle 
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Beyond that point, domestic shrimp prices will fall as tackle and equipment prices rise.   
 
2.3 Attribution of Injury  
To determine how much injury is attributable to subject imports versus other market 
factors, we apply the movements of each exogenous, explanatory variable over the POI to their 
respective coefficients from Figure 1.  Technically, the percentage effect on the dependent 





] % 1 ln( [ − = ∆
∆ + i i X
D e P
β ,                                                         (1) 
where Xi represents any of the explanatory variables entered logarithmically (i.e., , , 
, , , , and ) and
R P NR P
D Fxedp D Fish D Dsl 1 , − t D Sbr D Cpue i β  represents that variable’s respective 
coefficient.  Likewise, the relationship between domestic shrimp prices and time (Yearno) is  
1 %
] [ 1 − = ∆
∆Yearno
D e P
β .                                         (2) 
Further, since the relationship between domestic shrimp prices ( ) and tackle and ice prices 
( ) is log-quadratic, the percentage effect on the dependent variable from a change 
in tackle and ice prices is, technically 
D P
1 , _ − t D ice Tack
1 %
] _ _ [ 1 ,
2
2 1 , 1 − = ∆
− − ∆ + ∆ t D t D ice Tack ice Tack
D e P
β β .                                             (3) 
Equations (1), (2) and (3) were used to calculate the percentage impacts of each market 
factor on domestic shrimp prices over the POI. The percentage impacts were then multiplied by 
the actual dollar price of domestic shrimp in 2000 ($2.36/lbs) to determine the dollar effect each 
market factor had on domestic price deterioration over the POI.  Figure 3 summarizes the 
approximate effect of each market factor on domestic prices over the POI. 
As Figure 3 shows, tackle and ice prices ( ) had the greatest effect (in 
absolute value) on domestic shrimp prices over the POI.  In isolation, the increase in  
 from 2000 to 2002 negatively influenced domestic prices by about $0.62/lbs, but 
this negative effect is almost perfectly offset by the positive effect of catch per unit effort,  
1 , _ − t D ice Tack
1 , _ − t D ice Tack
                                                           
11 System weighted adjusted R
2 is approximately 1-(1-R
2)(n-1/n-k) = 0.8301. 
   5D Cpue  ($0.60/lbs).  Escalating food expenditures ( ) and building and repairing costs 
( ) positively influenced domestic shrimp prices (by $0.32/lbs and $0.49/lbs, respectively), 
while time (Yearno) as well as decreasing prices of substitute seafood goods ( ) and diesel 
prices ( ) negatively influenced domestic shrimp prices (by -$0.38/lbs,    -$0.20/lbs and -
$0.11/lbs respectively) over the POI.    
D Fxedp
1 , − t D Sbr
D Fish
D Dsl
The major result, however, concerns the effects of imports. While Respondent import 
prices ( ) did have a significant impact on domestic price deterioration over the POI, the effect 
of Non-respondent import prices ( ) is almost exactly the same.  Specifically, about $0.27/lbs 
of the domestic price deterioration experienced from 2000 to 2002 is attributable to Respondent 
shrimp imports, and about $0.28/lbs of it is attributable to Non-respondents (i.e., those countries 
not explicitly accused of engaging in “significant underselling” in the U.S. market).  In short, the 
Non-respondents—the countries that will not be subject to antidumping duties—had roughly the 




3.  Conclusion 
 
While the model produces a variety of interesting results concerning determinants of 
domestic shrimp prices, perhaps the most interesting result pertains to the effect of imports. 
Petitioners in this case alleged that Respondents were responsible for reductions in domestic 
shrimp prices over the POI.  Our findings suggest that about $0.27/lbs of the domestic price 
deterioration experienced over the POI was attributable to Respondent imports.  However, about 
$0.28/lbs of the domestic price deterioration was attributable to Non-respondent imports.  In 
short, the Non-respondents had roughly the same influence on declining domestic shrimp prices 
as their Respondent counterparts.    
One implication is that the low price of shrimp imports may be due to production and 
cost differentials, rather than predatory dumping.  Most shrimp from exporting countries is farm-
raised, which gives these exporters a cost advantage over Petitioner shrimp-boat operators who 
troll for their catch in open seas.  The coefficients and price effects of Respondents and Non-
respondents are remarkably close.  Do these similarities arise because the entire world is guilty 
of dumping their shrimp on the U.S. market?  Or, do these similarities arise because the rest of 
the world is using a technology (i.e., aquaculture) that the U.S. is slow to embrace?  
The most obvious implication, however, is that Respondents are not any more responsible 
for the U.S. industry’s predicament than the Non-respondents.  There are two concerns with 
punishing the Respondents with antidumping duties.  First, it seems inequitable to do so when 
Respondents are no more responsible than Non-respondents for the domestic industry’s injury.  
Second, it is unlikely that the imposition of antidumping duties on Respondents will alleviate a 
“problem” equally caused by Non-respondents.  Since the protection from competition sought by 
the domestic industry in this case will not affect imports from the Non-respondents, the 
anticipated price escalation that the domestic industry seeks may fall short of their expectations.  
Arguably, with antidumping duties imposed on the Respondents, the Non-respondents—rather 
than Petitioners—may realize the bigger boon.  The elimination of competition from Brazil, 
China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam is, of course, in the best interests of Non-
respondents, as well.  Since Mexico (a Non-respondent) has financially supported the Petitioners 
on this case (King, 2004), there is some evidence that some Non-respondent countries have been 
anxiously awaiting an affirmative material injury vote from the ITC. 
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   7Figure 1.  Simultaneous Equations Model for U.S. Warmwater Shrimp 











R P l   0.403 
[3.93]*** 
 
NR P l   0.409 
[2.90]*** 
 
D Fxedp l   1.518 
[2.32]** 
 
D Fish l   0.876 
[4.24]*** 
 




, _ − t D ice Tack  0.243 
[2.86]*** 
1 ,
2 _ − t D ice Tack    -0.001 
[-3.60]*** 
D Dsl l  0.298 
[3.01]*** 
1 , − t D Sbr l    4.401 
[2.35]** 




















































   Brackets contain t-statistics 
   ***=significant at α = 0.01 
     **=significant at α = 0.05 



















































































R P   Respondent 
prices ($/lbs) 
$4.84 $3.57 0.403 -11.54% -$0.27
NR P   Non-
respondent 
prices ($/lbs) 
$5.00 $3.67 0.409 -11.87% -$0.28
D Fxedp   Food 
expenditures 
($ million) 
$281,148 $306,067 1.518 13.76% $0.32




168.29 152.27 0.876 -8.39% -$0.20
Yearno  Year number  11 13 -0.088 -16.14%  -$0.38














D Dsl   Diesel price 
index 
93.27 79.90 0.298 -4.51% -$0.11
1 , − t D Sbr   Ship building 
and repairing 
price index 
138.00 144.00 4.401 20.62% $0.49
D Cpue   Catch per unit 
effort 
658.00 458.49 -0.623 25.24% $0.60
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